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PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW BY THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
PAUL R. VERXUIL*
The Federal Trade Commission is currently embarked on a regula-
tory program that could render the combined effect of all of its prior
activity insignficant by comparison. Through the use of recently acti-
vated trade regulation rule power the Commission is boldly reaching out
to preempt state laws and regulations that inhibit, in a variety of ways.
the operation of the competitive market. Already under attack are
restrictions on prescription drug price advertising by pharmacists and
prescription eyeglass advertising by optometrists and ophthalmologists.'
Soon to come under similar scrutiny are activities by veterinarians,
funeral homes, appliance repair businesses, and real estate brokers.2 The
Commission's approach is to mandate, through rules, federal deregula-
tion of state activity that protects selected businesses and professions
from the vicissitudes of competition. While estimates are difficult to
make, it does not seem unreasonable to predict that undoing the effect
of these and similar regulatory programs would save the consumer
several billion dollars in additional charges each year.' Looked at from
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THE FOLLOWING CITATION WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
FEDERAL TRADE CoMMsSIoN, STAFF REPORT ON PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICE DLSCLOS-
umRES (1975) [hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT].
1. See FTC NEws SUMMARY, June 6, 1975, at 1, 4 (proposed prescription drug
price advertising rules); id., Dec. 26, 1975, at 1 (proposed ophthalmic goods and services
rule).
2. See id., Jan. 2, 1976, at 2, 3 (investigations of occupational regulation in
veterinary medicine; residential real estate brokerage industry; and state-imposed barriers
to entry in appliance repair industry); id., Dec. 26, 1975, at 3 (announcement of funeral
industry rulemaking proceedings).
3. See, e.g., Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J.
LAW & ECON. 337 (1972) (documenting additional costs to consumers of eyeglasses in
states that restrict price advertising); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2
BELL J. ECON. & MANAGrMENT Sci. 3 (1971) (discussing eleven state-licensed occupa-
tions (including pharmacists) and concluding that licensees enjoy such profit advantages
that regulation itself becomes a product governed by laws of supply and demand).
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this perspective, these deregulation programs could well exceed the total
consumer benefit of all the Commission's prior regulatory activities.4
The current FTC rulemaking activity seems to be part of a general
awakening to the inefficiencies inherent in government regulation of the
marketplace at all levels. The Administration has commenced a major
drive for economic reform by urging deregulation of government
activities generally,5 and specifically by agencies such as the Civil Aero-
nautics Board and the Interstate Commerce Commission that restrict
price competition by airlines and motor carriers.6 This approach ap-
pears, on the surface at least, to have been reinforced by the Supreme
Court in important cases like The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Cottrell7 and Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar," which utilize the com-
merce clause and the Sherman Act, respectively, to undo state laws and
professional practices that inhibit retail price competition in the distribu-
tion of milk and price competition in the provision of lawyers' services.
But, despite this apparent affirmation, the Commission's rulemak-
ing proceedings are causing considerable consternation in several impor-
tant quarters. Many states are understandably uneasy about broad
federal intervention into matters of heretofore state economic concern,
and serious questions are being raised about the power of the Commis-
sion to preempt state laws and regulations.9 This unease has been
4. A trenchant criticism of the Commission -has been its failure to analyze its
enforcement activities in cost-benefit terms. See generally Posner, The Federal Trade
Commission, 37 U. CHr. L. REV. 47 (1969).
5. See Address by President Ford, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1974, at 24, col. 2
(advocating deregulation at federal level and antitrust attacks upon state regulation). The
Justice Department has commenced several antitrust actions against professional associa-
tions, the latest one against the American Pharmaceutical Association for conspiring to
restrain trade through its Code of Ethics that prohibits price advertising of prescription
drugs. United States v. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, Civil No. G 75-558-CA 5
(W.D. Mich., filed Nov. 11, 1975). The FTC has followed this lead with a section 5
complaint against the American Medical Association for its principles of Medical Ethics
which prevent price advertising of medical services. See FTC NEws SutmmRY, Dec. 26,
1975, at 1.
6. See H.R. 10,261, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (bill to reform CAB); H.R.
12,084, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (Motor Carrier Reform Act).
7. 96 S. Ct. 923 (1976).
8. 421 U.S. 773 (1975); accord, United States v. Oregon State Bar, 385 F. Supp.
507 (D. Ore. 1974). The Court will rule on the first amendment implications of
prescription drug advertising restrictions this term. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council
v. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Va. 1974), prob. juris noted,
420 U.S. 971 (1975).
9. See, eog., Letter from Anthony F. Troy, Chief Deputy Attorney General of
Virginia, to William D. Dixon, Special Assistant Director for Rulemaking of the Federal
Trade Commission, Aug. 5, 1975, prepared for FTC prescription drug price advertising
rulemaking proceeding.
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effectively communicated to Congress. A joint congressional resolution
is currently circulating in the halls of Congress which would declare the
Commission's newly minted rulemaking power to be non-preemptive.10
There seems to be little doubt that the preemption issue invites contro-
versy even from those who are enthusiastic about the merits of the
underlying economic issues.
The debate about preemption before the Commission largely cen-
ters upon Parker v. Brown," a celebrated case that refused to allow the
Sherman Act to upset a state regulatory scheme limiting the production
and marketing of agricultural products in California. Despite consider-
able confusion over the scope and meaning of what has become known
as the Parker doctrine, 12 the case is inevitably linked to a resolution of
the preemption issue. This is because Parker is one of the few judicial
attempts to reconcile the twin policies of antitrust and federalism. Even
Goldfarb, which seemingly strengthens current antitrust policies, does
not fail to acknowledge the continued viability of the Parker doctrine.'3
Obviously much is at stake on both sides of the preemption debate.
If the Commission is allowed to pursue its new regulatory program
without serious restraint, it can virtually undo the vast network of
"fence-me-in" laws that have distorted the competitive market since the
1930s.14 At the same time, however, the success of that effort could do
much to anachronize cherished notions of state independence and au-
tonomy. What is needed is a way of striking a balance between these
competing values. Ideally, this requires an approach that seeks to
maximize the efficiency goal while doing only minimal injury to the
political goal. This Article will explore the policy debate with this ideal
in mind and suggest a methodology that balances the legislative, admin-
istrative, and judicial functions accordingly.
I. THE PREEMPTION ISSUE IN CONTEXT
The Commission's prescription drug price advertising rule (drug
10. One congressional resolution, H.R. Cong. Res. 483, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov.
18, 1975) resolves: 'That the Congress has not delegated to the Federal Trade
Commission any authority to preempt the laws of the States and their political subdivi-
sions." For further discussion of this proposed resolution, see notes 90-91 infra and
accompanying text. A resolution supporting FTC preemption has been introduced by
Senator Church. S. Res. 357, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 27, 1976).
11. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
12. See generally Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker v. Brown State Action
Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1976); Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust:
Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75 CoLum. L. REv. 328 (1975).
13. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788-92 (1975).
14. See W. GELLHoRN, INDrVmuAL FREDom mD GovE 1TEAL R.snazmns 105-
51 (1956).
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rule) provides the best framework for analysis of the preemption issue
because that rule is the first to raise the preemption question directly,15
in the context of articulated debate,-' and with the prospect that the rule
will serve as the vehicle for judicial review.' 7 The drug rule declares it
to be an unfair act or practice (1) for any person to hinder, restrict, or
prohibit "the disclosure by any retail seller of accurate price information
regarding prescription drugs;' and (2) for any retail seller "to fail to
disclose adequate price information regarding prescription drugs to
potential purchasers."' 19 As part of the second requirement, the rule is
deemed violated if the retail seller refused to disclose "because of
or in connection with any law, rule, regulation or code of conduct of any
nonfederal legislative, executive, regulatory or licensing entity or any
other entity or person whatsoever, including but not limited to profes-
sional associations .... 20 To ensure that this language is not misun-
derstood, the rule closes with a clear declaration of Commission intent:
It is the intent of the Commission that this part shall preempt all non-
federal laws, ordinances or regulations that are repugnant to this part,
that would in any way frustrate the purpose of this part, that would in
any way prevent or burden any disclosures of accurate prescription
drug price information by retail sellers to potential purchasers ...."21
If promulgated substantially as proposed, the impact of this rule on
state laws and regulations will be staggering. Twenty-four states direct-
ly prohibit the advertising of actual prices of prescription drugs by
pharmacies; twelve do so by statute and twelve by pharmacy board
15. The preemption issue was present in earlier rulemaking proceedings but it
attracted little attention. The trade regulation rule which establishes a cooling-off period
for door-to-door sales, promulgated October 18, 1972, provides that state laws or
municipal ordinances would be preempted to the extent that they "are directly inconsist-
ent with the provisions of this section." 16 C.F.R. § 429, Note 2(b) (1975). It should
be noted that this rule was promulgated before the Commission's grant of rulemaking
power in the 1975 amendment. See note 61 infra.
16. The Commission has devoted substantial attention to the preemption issue in its
report accompanying the rule, see STAFF REPORT 493-589, and several witnesses have
submitted testimony on the issue. See Letter from Anthony F. Troy, supra note 9;
Statement of the Federation of Associations of Health Regulatory Boards, presented at
the Federal Trade Commission's Drug Rule Hearing, Jan. 13, 1976.
17. By all indications the drug rule will be the first completed rulemaking proceed-
ing. Judicial review of the rule may -be sought within sixty days in an appropriate
federal court of appeals. 15 U.S.C.A. § 57a(e) (Supp. 1976).
18. Disclosure Regulations Concerning Retail Prices for Prescription Drugs, 40 Fed.
Reg. 24,031 (1975) (codified at 16C.F.R. § 447.2).
19. Id. (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 447.3).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 24,032 (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 447.5).
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regulations.22 In addition, some eleven other states inhibit the advertis-
ing practices of pharmacists in ways which would undoubtedly "frus-
trate the purpose" of the Commission's rules.23  Thus some thirty-five
states will have explicit expressions of their public policy preempted by
the drug rule when it goes into effect. While the remaining states either
have no position on the matter, or have enacted laws and policies that
are in agreement with the drug rule,24 the overall effect of the rule
represents a dramatic challenge to the principles of federalism.
The power to preempt derives from the supremacy clause of the
Constitution,25 which invalidates any state law or regulation that "stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress. '2 6  Where there is either congressional
intent to occupy the field of regulation or a direct conflict between
federal and state law which creates a "repugnancy," preemption occurs
automatically, without any inquiry into the importance of the state
interestT Usually the search for congressional intent is only crucial
when the issue is federal occupation of the field, since if there is a
repugnancy situation the federal statute will in all likelihood resolve the
preemption issue on its face, or clearly within its terms. When the
preemption is created by federal agency rule, however, the question of
congressional intent remains serious even though the rule is repugnant
to state laws or regulations, as is the drug rule. In this situation the
agency is acting as the legislature, or more precisely sublegislature,28
and the court must still determine whether Congress intended to give the
agency the power to occupy the field or to create substantive rules
repugnant to state law. The requisite congressional intent to allow
agencies to preempt by rulemaking has been found on many occasions
in other contexts. 29 In those cases, however, the question was only
22. These laws have been collected and analyzed -by the Commission. See SraF
REPO T 33.
23. Some states inhibit price advertising by requiring extensive medical information
to accompany the advertisements and some bar the advertising of controlled substances.
See id. at 33-34.
24. Five states have recently removed all advertising prohibitions, and several states
require affirmative posting of prescription drug prices in pharmacies. See id. at 34-35.
25. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
26. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963).
27. In Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962), the Court stated: "The relative
importance to the State of its own law is not material when there is a conflict with a
valid federal law, for the Framers of our Constitution provided that the federal law must
prevail." Id. at 666.
28. See W. Gm.LHORN & C. BysE, ADMNimSTRATirE LAw 732 (6th ed. 1974).
29. See, e.g., Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962) (treasury regulations); Public
Utilities Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958) (procurement regulations);
Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187 (1956) (same).
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whether the rules were intended to have the force and effect of law.
While this question must also be asked in the context of the drug
rule, 0 additional emphasis is placed upon the -task of establishing
congressional intent to preempt when the federal power is asserted
through the antitrust laws. T.his is where Parker comes in, the Court
having there stated:
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history
which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or
agents from activities directed by its legislature. In a dual system of
government in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign,
save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract -from their authority,
an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers
and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.
The Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as such, and
gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official
action directed by a state.31
This desire not lightly to attribute preemption to the Sherman Act
becomes an additional hurdle for traditional preemption analysis. The
reason for this increased concern with preemption lies in the problems
confronting the Court when the case arose. 2 The Court that decided
Parker was in the process of emerging from substantive economic review
of state laws and regulations under the due process clause. If the
Sherman Act had been made preemptive the effect would have been
much like returning the Court to the era of substantive due process
review. The Sherman Act, with its broad due process-like reach,33 has
the potential to be a surrogate substantive due process clause, limited
only by the constantly shrinking interstate commerce requirement and
the active imagination of the Department of Justice.3 4 This understand-
30. There is no serious doubt that the drug rules, whether or not they are intended
to preempt, are clearly intended to have the substantive effect and force of law. See
STAFF REPORT 493-507.
31. 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943).
32. This historical argument is more fully developed in Verkuil, supra note 12, at
33040.
33. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933);
accord, United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) ("Antitrust
laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free
enterprise.").
34. The Justice Department's antitrust division appears to be turning 'with enthusi-
asm to the task of suggesting possible antitrust actions against state laws and regulations.
,For example, even Sunday closing laws have been mentioned as potential targets for
antitrust actions. See Verkuil, supra note 12, at 334 n.36. The substantive due process
analogy is heightened when it is recalled that Justice Holmes in his legendary Lochner
dissent specifically mentioned Sunday laws and usury laws as "ancient examples" of laws
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able concern with the preemptive effect of the antitrust laws-in partic-
ular the Sherman Act-is not without parallel today in the concern
about the limits on the imagination of another federal agency, the
Federal Trade Commission. By asserting the power to preempt under
the equally broad provisions of section 5 of the Sherman Act, the Com-
mission is inevitably invoking the concerns that led to the Parker deci-
sion in the first place.
There are certainly grounds for distinguishing Parker that are
worthy of consideration. The Commission has asserted,35 and recent
comment has supported,3 6 the idea that the Federal Trade Commission
Act (FTCA) is not the kind of "antitrust law" that worried the Parker
Court. The FTCA is seen as different from the Sherman Act because it
seeks to correct abuses that fall outside the scope of traditional antitrust
concerns.3 7 In addition the FTCA is viewed as less disruptive of state
activities because it, unlike the Sherman Act, cannot be invoked by
private parties intent upon recovering treble damages for personal inju-
ries without regard for larger notions of public interest and orderly
federal-state relations. 38 While these distinctions have some force, the
fact remains that the FTCA is still, at its core, an antitrust law,39 and the
effect of preemption upon state economic policy would still be substan-
tially disruptive.40 In the final analysis, the question to be answered
remains the same: Did Congress intend to preempt state laws either
through passage of the Sherman Act or the FTCA? That question can
only be answered with confidence in terms of the Parker doctrine.
It should be recalled that Parker held the Sherman Act to be non-
preemptive only if certain conditions surrounding the state regulation
were met, such as state-created regulatory machinery operating under
the supervision and control of state officials. The Court made clear that
that permissibly interfere with the liberty of contract. See Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 75 (1905).
35. See STArF REPoRT 493-511.
36. Note, The State Action Exemption and Antitrust Enforcement Under the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 89 Hv. L. REv. 715 (1976).
37. See STAFF REPORT 518-22, citing FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233
(1972) (broad interpretation of Commission's "unfairness" jurisdiction).
38. See Note, supra note 36, at 732-33.
39. See text accompanying notes 53-54 infra.
40. It is true that private parties cannot benefit from its coverage, but the fact is that
private treble damages actions may not be a real threat since there is substantial
question whether such a remedy is available against a state in the first place. See
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); cf. Employees of the Dep't v. Department of
Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973) (double damages under FISA held too
harsh for "harmonious federalism").
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it was interested only in insulating this kind of state action from Sher-
man Act scrutiny, not in giving all state laws with anticompetitive effect
insulation from preemption.4 The state must have made a commit-
ment to a regulatory scheme that replaces the market mechanism with
some other method of economic regulation. As the Court later held,
merely passing a law that abrogates competition is not enough.42 In
keeping with this approach, a lower court has held that the Parker
doctrine does not apply to a section 5 proceeding against a privately
controlled regulatory body that restricts competition among its mem-
bers43 and the Commission itself has acknowledged the applicability of
Parker to decisions of state milk commissions. 44  The Goldfarb case
serves to confirm the continued vitality of the Parker doctrine, since the
Court there made it clear that the Virginia legislature did not fulfill the
first Parker condition by involving itself in the regulatory scheme.45
Despite the fact that the result in Goldfarb was pro-antitrust, there is
little doubt that the Court remains dubious about application of the
antitrust laws to state regulated businesses and professions.46 Indeed,
there are indications in cases like Fry v. United States 7 that the Court
41. Parker contains the following qualifier: 'True, a state does not give immunity to
those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that
their action is lawful. . . ." 317 U.S. at 351.
42. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951) (Louisi-
ana law requiring nonsigners of private agreement to adhere to minimum resale
prices set by agreement held state compulsion of private conduct, not Parker-type state
action). The McGuire Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970), which subsequently approved
the conduct forbidden in Schwegmann, was itself recently repealed. Pub. L. No. 94-145,
89 Stat. 801 (Dec. 12, 1975).
43. Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959). The
Tobacco Board of Trade, which administered competition by fixing selling time at
tobacco auctions, consisted solely of existing members of the industry who used their
authority to weaken the marketing position of new entrants.
44. See 32 Fed. Reg. 20,716 (1967) (milk commissions often have "public" mem-
bers).
45. 421 U.S. 773. 788-92 (1975). The case might have been different if Virginia
had enacted a law requiring minimum fees as an aspect of ethics regulation. The Court
went on to hold that even though there was a state regulatory body, the State Bar, with
jurisdiction over the ethical conduct of lawyers, that body could not regulate minimum
fees as an incident of that jurisdiction. Id. at 791-92.
46. Id. at 792-93. Immediately after deciding Goldfarb, the Court vacated and
remanded a decision that held a professional ethical restriction against competitive
bidding by engineering services to be a violation of the Sherman Act. See National
Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 422 U.S. 1031 (1975).
47. 421 U.S. 542 (1975). Although Fry held that Congress could validly regulate
minimum wages and maximum hours of state and local government employees, the Court
observed: "While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a "truism,"... it is
not without significance. The Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy
that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or
their ability to function effectively in a federal system." Id. at 547 n.7.
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may see fit to revive the tenth amendment as a means of restricting
federal regulatory power over affairs traditionally within the state's
jurisdiction.48
The implications of these developments for the Commission's drug
rule should be apparent. As a preliminary matter, it may be that the
added search for congressional intent to preempt, suggested by the
Parker doctrine, will come into play only when the questioned activity is
legislatively enacted and controlled. Thus, if the state law merely
proscribed prescription drug price advertising without establishing a
pharmacy regulatory board, or some equivalent body, the Parker doc-
trine arguably would not be applicable.49  Alternatively, if the state
legislature does not direct the pharmacy board's activities,50 or if the
legislature has not specifically directed the board to control prescription
drug price advertising,"1 the Parker doctrine would again be displaced.
This would suggest that some of the state activities currently sought to
be proscribed by the drug rule would not be entitled to the close scrutiny
on the preemption issue directed by Parker in any event. In the main,
however, the drug rule is seeking to upset enough qualified state
schemes to force the rule to be reviewed in terms of the Parker doctrine,
to say nothing of incipient tenth amendment requirements. Therefore,
the focus inevitably shifts directly to the issue of congressional authority
to preempt state law under the FTCA.
IE. THE SEARCH FOR CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
Before the Commission can preempt state law its power to do so
must be established by Congress. If the implications of Parker are
accepted, this grant of power must clearly be found in the legis-
lative history. This search for congressional intent can best be
divided into the periods before and after the 1975 amendments to the
FTCA, since those amendments have coincided with, and may in large
48. Subsequent to Fry, the Court set down for reargument this term a case seeking
further to extend Congress's authority to regulate maximum wages and hours of state
employees. National League of Cities v. Dunlop, 421 U.S. 986 (1975). Professor
Gunther sees this as an "important straw in the wind" for federalism. G. GumrmR,
CASES AND MATERIALS IN CONSITrUTIONAL Lw 125-26 (9th ed. 1975). Professor
Strong is more skeptical. See Strong, Court vs. Constitution. Disparate Distortions of
the Indirect Limitations in the American Constitutional Framework, 54 N.C.L. Rav. 125
(1976). If one were to look for exercises of federal power that would be seen to impair
a state's integrity or ability to function, attempts to preempt Sunday closing laws would
come immediately to mind. See note 34 supra.
49. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
50. See notes 43-44 supra and accompanying text.
51. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
Vol. 1976:2251
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
measure have triggered, the Commission's current preemption cam-
paign.
A. Legislative History Before 1975
A brief review of the legislative history of the 1914 FTCA, which
prohibited "unfair methods of competition in commerce," makes clear
that the Act itself was seen as a method of strengthening and making
more precise existing provisions of the Sherman Act. The concern at
the time was with the open-ended nature of the Sherman Act, and the
FTCA was initially seen by President Woodrow Wilson as merely
creating an advisory arm of the Justice Department that businessmen
could turn to for the resolution of antitrust matters. On December 2,
1913, President Wilson addressed Congress on the need to prevent
private monopolies:
I think it will be easily agreed that we should let the Sherman anti-
trust law stand unaltered, as it is, with its debatable ground about it,
but that we should as much as possible reduce the area of that de-
batable ground by further and more explicit legislation, and should
also supplement that great act by legislation which will not only clarify
it, but also facilitate its administration and make it fairer to all con-
cerned.
[ . . The business men of this country should be relieved of all
uncertainties of law with regard to their enterprises and investments
and a clear path indicated which they can travel without anxiety.52
But the 1914 Congress, bolder than Wilson in this regard, adopted a
stronger substitute bill 3 which created a regulatory commission with the
authority to promulgate substantive rules of antitrust liability. The
phrase "unfair methods of competition" was seen not so much as
extending beyond antitrust, but as offering the FTC greater flexibility in
regulating monopolistic activities in their formative stages.5 4 There-
fore, the 1914 Act principally shored up acknowledged gaps in the
52. E. BROOKS, WOODROW WILSON AS PRESIDENT 125-26 (1916).
53. Representative Stevens of New Hampshire submitted a substitute bill that had
been prepared by Louis Brandeis. See H.R. REP. No. 533, Pt. 2, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1914).
54. See, e.g., 51 CoNo. REc. 14,941 (1914) (Rep. Stevens). There was a lengthy
debate, however, over the indefiniteness of the term "unfair competition," with some
senators believing it to be limited to the antitrust context and others feeling that it
extended beyond traditional competitive injuries. See generally Montague, Unfair Meth-
ods of Competition, 25 YALE L.J. 2) (1915). One definitional touchstone the debaters
looked to was state law that utilized the term, id. at 36, indicating an apparent intention
not to have the 1914 Act occupy the field of unfair competition regulation. See notes 68
& 81 infra and accompanying text.
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Sherman Act enforcement powers. In this sense it looked, for preemp-
tion purposes, much like the Sherman Act itself.
The subsequent judicial interpretations of the 1914 Act limited it
severely by making injury to competitors a sine qua non to liability.1r
This led to the 1938 Wheeler-Lea amendments to the FTCA 6 which
gave the Commission jurisdiction over "unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices" and were designed to liberate enforcement policy by expanding
the focus of the original legislation to allow proof of injury to consumers
as well as competitors. 57 While this jurisdiction allowed the Commission
to function both as a consumer protection agency and an antitrust
agency, there was no indication that Congress intended by that act to
allow the Commission to preempt state law. In fact, a search of the
1914 and 1938 legislative history has revealed no discussion of the
preemption issue.58 In the face of this congressional silence, Parker's
counsel seems clearly against preemption. It seems unlikely, therefore,
that had the 1943 Parker court been confronted with a challenge under
section 5 rather than the Sherman Act, it would have found the requisite
congressional intent to preempt.59 This certainly does not end the
inquiry, however, since there are subsequent legislative developments
that remain to be evaluated.
B. The 1975 Legislative History
Unlike the prior legislation, the 1975 amendment 0 contains refer-
ences to preemption in various bills and committee reports that form the
legislative background to the final enactment. The 1975 amendment
contains two changes which are particularly relevant to an informed
discussion of the preemption issue raised by the drug rule. 1 These are
55. See FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
56. Wheeler-Lea Amendments, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
45(a) (1) (1970)).
57. See S. REP. No. 221, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937); H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1937). Earlier Senator Copeland had observed:
I think it is very wise that the Federal Trade Commission is going to be per-
mitted to go outside the question of whether or not a given competitor is dam-
aged, because, after all, the person we are thinking most about is not the owner
of some commercial concern, but we are thinking about the American citizen.
80 CoNG. REc. 6594 (1936).
58. This is the conclusion reached by others as well. See Note, supra note 36, at
740-41.
59. Arguably later courts in applying Parker would have reached the same result,
but the fact is that the challenge was not presented by the FTC during those years.
60. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 88
Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 45 et seq. (Supp. 1976)).
61. The amendment contains two parts: title I, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2301-2312 (Supp.
1976), which deals with-consumer product warranties and title II, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 45, 49,
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the rulemaking0 2 and jurisdictional provisions which broaden FTC juris-
diction from matters "in" to those "in or affecting" commerce."8 The
legislative history behind both of these changes helps to resolve the
current inquiry. Of principal concern are the three Senate bills6" and
one House bill, 5 each with amendments and accompanying legislative
reports, that led to the 1975 amendment.
The first legislative activity occurred in December, 1969, when
Senate Bill 3201 was introduced and referred to the Senate Commerce
Committee. 6 After hearings, the bill was reported out of committee in
August, 1970, with the following provision:
The amendments made by this title shall not affect the jurisdiction of
any court or agency of any State or the application of the law of any
State with respect to any matter over which the Federal Trade Commis-
sion has jurisdiction by reason of such amendment insofar as such
jurisdiction or the application of such law does not conflict with the
provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act, regulations there-
under, or the exercise of any authority by the Commission under such
Act.67
This bill, which speaks clearly to preemption for repugnancy,68a was
referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, and was reported out
53, 56, 57 (Supp. 1976), which deals with rulemaking and jurisdiction. The warranty
provisions contemplate preemption of state law in certain respects, since the purpose of
the provision is to establish uniform federal rules relating to warranty protection.
However, state court jurisdiction and damage liability for warranty disputes is retained,
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970); 15 U.S.C.A. § 2311 (Supp. 1976), and state laws that afford
"greater" protection to consumers and are "effectively" enforced are left undisturbed. 15
U.S.C.A. § 2311(c)(2) (Supp. 1976). The net effect of the warranty provisions is to
postulate a cooperative relationship between state and federal authorities that negates
federal intent to occupy the field of regulation so long as states aspire to similar
regulatory goals. This is an approach similar to that undertaken by the Commission in
its earlier door-to-door sales rule. See note 15 supra. While it is fraught with difficult
definitional judgments, the approach appears, in theory, to respect notions of cooperative
federalism.
There were other significant FTC "improvements" in the amendment (such as
increased fines, inspection of documents, commission representation in court proceedings,
and preliminary restraint power) that do not directly raise the preemption issue.
62. 15 U.S.C.A. § 57a (Supp. 1976).
63. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (Supp. 1976).
64. See notes 66, 69, 72 infra and accompanying text.
65. See note 78 infra and accompanying text.
66. S. 3201, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (Dec. 3, 1969).
67. Id. § 106.
68. The Senate report makes clear that the purpose of section 106 was to indicate
that the provisions of the bill relating to expansion of jurisdiction over matters "affect-
ing" commerce "do not preempt or affect state laws not in conflict" with the act. S.
REP. No. 1124, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1970). Stated alternatively, this provision was
intended to preempt conflicting or repugnant state laws whether the conflict arose
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by that committee on October 5, 1970, without recommendations, but it
did not pass the Senate and nothing further was heard from it.
In February, 1971, Senate Bill 986 was introduced.69  This bill
expanded legislative concern beyond the jurisdictional and rulemaking
provisions to include the Magnuson-Moss warranty legislation.7" While
it did not contain a preemption provision as Senate Bill 3201 had done,
explicit reference to preemption by rulemaking is made in the Commit-
tee Report:
In the course of the Committee's consideration of the Commis-
sion's rulemaking power the issue of preemption was discussed. At
the present time a Trade Regulation Rule would preempt state legisla-
tion or regulation that conflicted. But the "conflict" test is a very
difficult one to apply.
It is the view of this Committee that the Federal Trade Commission
would be empowered to prescribe with specificity, when promulgating
legislative rules, the extent to which comparable State law is preempted
and how it is preempted. For example, if the Commission were to pre-
scribe a uniform national rule governing the practices of door-to-door
salesmen it would prescribe the effect of that rule on the various state
statutes. It might standardize the forms to be used and the procedures
to be followed while specifically leaving state law intact as to enforce-
ment procedures and penalty provisions. 71
This bill passed the Senate on November 8, 1971, and was sent to the
House Committtee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, but it received
no further consideration before the end of the Ninety-Second Congress.
The third Senate bill, Senate Bill 356,72 was closely patterned after
Senate Bill 986 except that it initially contained a section precisely
dealing with preemption by rulemaking. 73  This provision, section 206,
directly from the act or the regulations promulgated by rulemaking thereunder. Another
reference in the report makes the point that the expansion-of-jurisdiction section "is not
intended to replace local enforcement of state or local laws against unfair or deceptive
acts or practices." Id. at 9.
69. S. 986, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). The bill was referred to the Senate
Commerce Committee and reported out with an amendment on July 16, 1971. See S.
REP. No. 269, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
70. S. 986, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., title II (1971).
71. S. REP. No. 269, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1971). It could be argued that the
phrase "at the present time" indicated a congressional intent to declare existing FTC
jurisdiction preemptive where, for example, it had then been implemented in the door-to-
door sales rule. See note 15 supra. But the Ninety-Second Congress's intent with respect
to preemption cannot be used retroactively to fill the void created by the silence of
earlier Congresses on the preemption issue.
72. S. 356, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
73. S. 356, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 206(2) (1973) provided:
(vii) Whenever the Commission determines in a rulemaking proceeding
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which appears to be a broad grant to the FTC of preemption power over
nonconforming state laws and regulations,"' was deleted along with the
entire rulemaking section when the bill was reported out of the Com-
merce Committee.7 5  Significantly, this deletion was requested by
Chairman Lewis Engman of the Federal Trade Commission on the
ground that then pending litigation would adequately resolve the ques-
tion of the Commission's rulemaking power. 6 While the litigation did
pursuant to paragraph (g) (2) that uniformity in the engagement of any act
or practice in compliance with a rule issued pursuant to paragraph (g) (2) is
in the public interest and necessary to carry out the intent of this Act, the
Commission shall include in such rule a description of the extent to which such
rule will preempt State and local requirements relating to the same acts orprac-
tices affected by the Commission's rule. The reasons for preemption, or lack
thereof, including the extent of consideration given to the need for uniformity,
shall be set forth in the rule with specificity.
Upon petition by any State, or political subdivision thereof, the Commis-
sion may, by rule, after notice and opportunity for presentation of views, ex-
empt from the provisions of this subsection, under conditions as it may impose,
any State or local requirement that (1) affords protection to consumers greater
than provided in the applicable Commission rule, (2) is required by compelling
local conditions, and (3) does not unduly burden interstate commerce. The
Commission shall maintain continuing jurisdiction over those States or locali-
ties specifically exempted under this subsection, and may withdraw the exemp-
tion granted whenever it is determined that the State or locality is not effi-
ciently enforcing its requirements or that such exemption is no longer in the
public interest.
Since this section was subsequently deleted, the Senate Committee report does not dis-
cuss its purpose or reach. Its similarity to the approach taken in the consumer war-
ranty legislation should, however, be noted. See note 61 supra.
74. The Committee Report did say, however, that "State and local consumer
protection efforts are not to be supplanted" by the affecting commerce jurisdiction. S.
REP. No. 151, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1973).
75. The Commerce Committee reported the bill on May 14, 1973, S. REP. No. 151,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), and referred it to the Senate Committee on Banking
Housing and Urban Affairs (for consideration of provisions relating to unfair and
deceptive bank practices) and that committee, in turn, reported the bill out on June 28,
1973. S. REP. No. 280, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
76. The Senate report, S. REP. No. 151, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1973), described
the reason for the rulemaking deletion as follows:
During the 92d Congress, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-FTC bill (S.986)
as passed by the Senate contained a provision reaffirming the legislative rule-
making authority of the Commission. A similar, provision was included in
S.356 as introduced in the 93d Congress, but in a letter to Chairman Magnuson
dated March 26, 1973, Chairman Engman informed the committee that:
... the commission has concluded that it should await the imminent
court decision and seek additional legislative authority only in the event
of an adverse decision. The Commission, therefore, recommends that sec-
tion 206 be deleted from the bill. Such a course will not jeopardize Com-
mission rulemaking, and, in the meantime, American consumers can begin
to reap the benefits associated with prompt enactment of the less contro-
versial amendments provided in the legislation before this committee.
In accordance with the Commission's recommendation, the Committee deleted
the rulemaking provisions from S.356 in executive session.
Chairman Magnuson has pledged, however, to reintroduce legislation
granting the Commission the power to promulgate legislative rules in the event
of a decision by the courts which is adverse to the Commission on this issue.
In other words, the deletion of rulemaking powers by the Committee is not to
be read in any way as a reversal of the Senate's position in the 92d Congress,
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ultimately decide that the Commission had substantive rulemaking juris-
diction, it did not in any way comment upon the preemption issue.7"
Senate Bill 356 passed the Senate on September 12, 1973 without a
rulemaking provision and was referred to the House.
The House bill that paralleled Senate Bill 35678 initially contained
no reference to rulemaking, but the rulemaking provision as ultimately
enacted was added in committee.79  The House committee report is
silent on specific references to preemption and rulemaking, as are the
subsequent conference committee reports of the House and Senate,80 but
the committee report does discuss preemption in connection with the
expansion to "in or affecting commerce." It states:
The amendments made by section 201 will permit more effective
regulation of the marketplace by the FTC by placing within its reach
unfair or deceptive acts or practices which, although local in character,
affect interstate commerce. The expansion of the FTC's jurisdiction
made by this section 201 is not intended to occupy the field or in any
way to preempt State or local agencies from carrying out consumer
protection or other activities within their jurisdiction which are also
within the expanded jurisdiction of the Commission.
Where cases of consumer fraud of a local nature which affect
commerce are being effectively dealt with by State or local govern-
ment agencies, it is the Committee's intent that the Federal Trade
Commission should not intrude. 8'
This is the last word on preemption in the legislative history. Senate
Bill 356 passed the House and Senate on September 19, 1974, compro-
when it passed legislation by a vote of 72-2 which expressly conferred legis-
lative rulemaking power upon the Commission.
Chairman Engman was apparently concerned that the pending congressional rulemaking
provision might affect the court's judgment about the Commission's substantive rulemak-
ing power under existing legislation, a not uncontroversial issue at the time. See
Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Adminutra-
tive Policy, 78 HAIV. L. REv. 921, 958-67 (1965).
77. See National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). At issue were FTC octane rules which did not seek
to preempt any state laws or regulations, so the Court had no occasion to deal with the
issue of preemption under pre-1975 law.
78. H.R. 7911, 93d Cong., lst Sess. (1973); see S. 356,'93d Cong., lst SeSs. (1973).
79. See H.R. 7917 § 202, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). For a statement
of the committee's reasons for adding the rulemaking provision to the bill, see HousE
CoMM. oN ,INTEsTATE AND FOREGN CommERcE, CONSUmL PRODUCT WARRANTEEs
AND FEmERAL TRD E CoMMIssioN AcT, H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Ses. at 32-
33 (1974).
80. See H.R. RP. No. 1606, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); S. REP. No. 1408, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
81. H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1974).
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mises were worked out in December, 1974,2 and the bill became law
on January 4, 1975.
m. AN EVALUATION OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
The foregoing review of the legislative history demonstrates that
Congress did not consider the preemptive effect of the FTCA until the
events leading to the 1975 amendment. While it could be argued that
congressional silence in the earlier enactments amounts to acceptance of
the preemption argument, neither the Commission nor the courts did
much to advance that argument in earlier cases88 and it remains uncon-
vincing. On this "record" Parker becomes in many ways the closest
precedent, and its counsel is against attributing lightly to Congress the
intent to preempt in the antitrust field. It is hard not to conclude that
something more than silence must be expressed by Congress before
Parker-type preemption should take place.
In this respect the legislative history of the 1975 amendment differs
significantly from the prior legislative history. Although the version
that became law is not as clear on the subject as earlier versions, 84
Congress clearly worried about the preemptive effect of the rulemaking
and jurisdictional provisions of the amendment. In its final expression
of that concern, Congress reached what may best be seen as a middle
position on the preemption issue that is reminiscent of the approach
taken in the consumer warranty provision. The House report made
plain that the expansion of juisdiction to "affecting commerce" was not
of itself intended to preempt state or local laws or regulations dealing
with unfair or deceptive commercial activity.8 5 This establishes that
Congress did not, without more, intend for the amendment to occupy
the field of consumer protection regulation. But that report goes on to
provide, by negative implication, that the FTC may "intrude" upon state
and local enforcement activities when such regulation is ineffective. 8
The suggestion from this is that repugnancy and even occupation-of-the-
field preemption are contemplated when state and local activities are in-
adequate or counter-productive, which is the case with most of the drug
price advertising restrictions. Coincidently, this interpretation reflects a
82. See note 80 supra.
83. There are a few earlier cases that have raised the preemption issue obliquely but
they did not discuss Parker and they were decided in a nonrepugnancy context. These
cases are collected and well analyzed in Note, supra note 36, at 717 nn.13-14. As the
author there concluded, the cases do not present a full consideration of the preemption
issue and for that reason are unpersuasive.
84. Compare text at notes 67 & 73 supra with note 81 supra and accompanying text.
85. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
86. H.R. REP. No. 1'107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1974).
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congressional concern for federalism that is reminiscent of the judicial
concern underlying the Parker doctrine.
Moreover, this background to the preemption issue in the jurisdic-
tional context also finds support in the congressional discussion sur-
rounding the rulemaking provision. The report supporting Senate Bill
986 indicates that the rules would preempt state laws and regulations
that "conflict"8 1 with its terms. The conflict test meshes well with
earlier expressed concern that the FTCA not occupy the field of con-
sumer protection regulation.88 Congressional intent with respect to
repugnancy preemption does not appear to be rebutted by the fact that
Senate Bill 356, the bill that became law, had the rulemaking provision
temporarily withdrawn from it and ultimately returned in revised
form. 89
The fact that Congress is currently circulating a concurrent resolu-
tion which specifically rejects any congressional intent to preempt 0 does
not of course affect the basic inquiry of whether preemption was intend-
ed in the first place. But the resolution itself seems to be premised on a
misapprehension of the important distinction between repugnancy and
occupation-of-the-field preemption. The resolution attacks the drug
rule for mandating repugnancy preemption in the face of the congres-
sional intent not to preempt state and local regulation that was expressed
in the House committee report.91 As has been discussed, the focus of
that restraint is directed at occupation of the consumer protection field.
The report does not appear to restrict Commission activity, taken after
careful consideration of the alternatives, that either declares a specific
consumer protection law or regulation ineffective (as the consumer
warranty legislation does) or declares state laws or regulations outside
the consumer protection area inconsistent with the FTCA (as the drug
rule does). Whatever its ultimate effect, the concurrent resolution cer-
87. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
88. Under the pre-1975 FTCA, courts have held that the act did not preempt state
and local laws and regulations dealing with unfair and deceptive practices. See, e.g..
Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821, 825 (W.D. Va. 1969).
89. It could be argued that since the Senate report accompanying Senate Bill 356 did
not repeat the preemption discussion contained in the Senate Bill 986 report, see text
accompanying note 71 supra, preemption was not similarly intended. But given the
fact that the provision had been withdrawn at the Commission's request and not at
the request of the members of congress antipathetic to preemption, the differences in
legislative history do not seem significant.
90. See note 10 supra.
91. H.R. Rm,. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). See text accompanying note
81 supra. The concurrent resolution is sponsored by Congressman Staggers (and
others); Mr. Staggers also stated the separate views on preemption contained in the
house report. H.R. RP. No. 1107.
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tainly encourages the Commission to explore the preemption issue
carefully with federalism interests fully in mind.
The review of congressional intent presented here has several con-
sequences for future FTC enforcement actions. If there is no intent to
preempt under prior law, the Commission can only proceed against state
laws and regulations in terms of the 1975 amendment. And this is not
a distinction without a difference. There are, on the contrary, clear
limits placed upon the Commission's enforcement alternatives as a re-
sult of such a conclusion.
For one thing, the "affecting commerce" provision presumably
allows the Commission to broaden its jurisdiction to reach anticompeti-
tive activity in situations where state and local enforcement is "ineffec-
tive," but the obligation to make that determination at the outset of an
adjudicative or rulemaking proceeding is a real check on the FTC en-
forcement process. Compliance with it can be measured by the
courts, and as the concurrent resolution suggests, monitored by the
Congress. Moreover, the 1975 rulemaking provision serves to narrow
the Commission's rulemaking power from that which obtained as a
result of the National Petroleum Refiners case.9' The amendment
specifically outlines a rulemaking process that is both procedurally and
substantively more stringent than that which obtained under earlier law.
The power to preempt state laws and regulations through rulemaking is
limited by the additional procedures prescribed in the amendment" and
further limited to rules proscribing unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
ticesY4 The desire to limit the reach of the new rules was apparently the
result of a concern by Congress that rulemaking is a powerful tool that
should be carefully controlled. 5 This concern is particularly acute
where state laws and regulations are sought to be displaced as ineffec-
92. See note 77 supra. National Petroleum Refiners had held that the Federal Trade
Commission Act conferred on the FTC the authority to promulgate trade regulation
rules which have the effect of substantive law.
93. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 57a (Supp. 1976). It provides procedures for informal
rulemaking that exceed the normal notice and comment provisions of the APA, 5 U.s.C.
§ 553 (1970), including limited rights of cross-examination on issues of fact, the right to
oral argument, and the right to a more detailed statement of basis and purpose.
94. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 57a(a)(2) (Supp. 1976). The provision specifically leaves
out jurisdiction to make rules with respect to unfair methods of competition, which must
now be left to the Commission's rulemaking power under section 6(g) of the FrCA. 38
Stat. 722 (1914).
95. This limitation on the new rulemaking power was discussed in the legislative
history by Rep. Broyhill as follows:
Antitrust rules would obviously have a far more pervasive effect than rules de-
fining unfair or deceptive acts or practices, and I would feet very uncomfort-
able giving such antitrust rules the same effect as this bill gives consumer prac-
tice rules. 120 CoNe. Rl~c. 12,348 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1974).
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five or counter-productive. Indeed, the rulemaking procedures desig-
nate three specific mechanisms to ensure that the preemption decision
will be carefully made. First, the additional hearing procedures guaran-
tee that all states will have notice of impending rules and the opportun-
ity to make a record with oral presentations and cross-examination on
specific issues of fact.9 Second, the scope of review over the resulting
preemptive rule is expanded to ensure that the courts look closely at its
basis and rationale. And third, the rulemaking provisions specifically
allow for exemptions from the rule's effect.91 Each of these provisions
in its own way serves to implement the felt concern of the 1975 Con-
gress with keeping the preemption function of the FTC under strict
control.
IV. OBSERVATIONS ON AGENCY SELF RESTRAINT,
FEDERALISM AND THE ROLE OF JuDICIAL REVIEW
An evaluation of legislative history, even that of the 1975 amend-
ment, shows that the ability of the Commission to preempt state laws
and regulations by rulemaking or adjudication is not unconstrained by
considerations of federalism. Congressional respect for federalism is
reflected in the desire not to intrude upon "effective" state regulation,
and in the procedural safeguards surrounding the rulemaking provision.
These expressions of concern impose responsibilities upon both the
Commission and the courts to determine in each case the appropriate
scope of preemption jurisdiction.
The Commission has accepted a restraint upon its enforcement
activities that is designed to meet the acknowledged needs of federal-
state cooperation. The Staff Report proposes a "standard of self-
restraint '9 8 that establishes the following guideline: "The Commission
should only preempt offensive state law that is not (i) vital to achieve
(ii) important state policy goals." 9 This test bristles with problems of
interpretation, but it bears some resemblance to the approach taken by
the Court in commerce clause litigation. In The Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell,' the Court recently overturned a Mississip-
96. The proposed specific issues of fact are required by Commission procedures to
be designated by the rulemaking parties in advance of the oral presentations. 16 C.F.R.
§ 1.16(b) (1975). It is frequently not easy to identify such issues in advance, nor
indeed on occasion to identify them at all. While the Commission appears to take the
position that it is up to the parties to identify these issues, there will undoubtedly be
occasions where the record itself will place that burden directly upon the Commission.
97. 15 U.S.C.A. § 57a(g) (Supp. 1976).
98. STAFF REPORT 314; see id. at 314-18.
99. Id. at 3,16.
100. 96 S. Ct. 923 (1976).
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pi state law that forbade the importation of milk from other states unless
those states reciprocated by accepting Mississippi milk. The Court
overturned this reciprocity clause because it did not reflect a "vital"
interest (in public health) which would have been necessary to balance
against the "devastating" impact upon interstate commerce. 101 The
Commission's test can borrow this balancing approach in some measure,
but it should in addition carve out clear limits on the scope of relevant
inquiry where possible. For one thing, a solid argument can be made
that the Commission ought never try to displace traditional state
public utility regulation that sets minimum and maximum rates, estab-
lishes terms and conditions of service, and restricts entry and exit. This
regulation has historically been free of federal interference even during
the substantive due process era °2 and there is little reason to subject it
to attack under the FTCA.' °s Usually this form of regulation sur-
rounds industries which exhibit the characteristics of natural monopolies
where competition by hypothesis cannot exist. In some cases, such as
milk regulation, 10 4 the natural monopoly analogy is inapposite even
though the state regulatory scheme is of the public utility type. From a
preemption perspective, this economic distinction should be irrelevant.
The question is not whether the state chose properly by perceived
economic rationales to displace the private market, but rather, whatever
the source of its choice, whether the regulation is necessary to accom-
plish important state policy goals. The focus is on the nature and thor-
101. The Court concluded:
Only state interests of substantial importance can save [the reciprocity clause]
in the face of that devastating effect upon the free flow of interstate milk.
Mississippi's contention that the reciprocity clause serves its vital interests
in maintaining the State's health standards borders on the frivolous. Id. at
930.
Cf. Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Economic Due Process, 80
HAlv. L. REv. 1463 (1967).
102. See Verkuil, supra note 12, at 330-40.
103. The recent concern with anticompetitive state-inspired protections of the profes-
sions does not appear to have undermined traditional state economic regulation.
Goldfarb, for example, sustained an attack upon minimim fee schedules which, even if
state regulated, were not designed to regulate competition in the public interest as
maximum rate regulation is, in theory at least. And the theory of the regulation is as far
as the Commission ought to look. To go beyond the regulatory theory would entangle
the Commission in imponderable questions about the quality of the regulatory perform-
ance and lead it to second guess individual ratemaking determinations.
104. The Commission has recently attacked by adjudication advertising practices of
the California milk regulatory authority that were approved by the State's Director of
Food and Agriculture. its action was enjoined on the basis of Parker. California ex rel.
Christensen v. FTC, 1974-2 Trade Cas. 75,238, at 98,038 (N.D. Cal. 1974). An
appeal to the Ninth Circuit is pending. The Commission had earlier issued an advisory
opinion that acknowledged the relevance of Parker to decisions of state milk commis-
sions. See 32 Fed. Reg. 20,716 (Dec. 21, 1967).
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oughness of the regulatory scheme, not the commitment to microeco-
nomic theory. For the FTC to require more would be tantamount to
a return to the substantive due process era that neither Congress nor
the Constitution 05 is prepared to accept in the economic realm.100
Therefore, so long as the form of regulation is of the public utility type,
it can be viewed as per se "vital" and Commission preemption jurisdic-
tion should be restrained.
Beyond the public utility context there are other state laws that are
also "vital" for other reasons. Sunday closing laws and other blue laws
have developed over time as reflections of religious and community
customs. 10 7 They reflect notions of state sovereignty that in some cases
antedate the Constitution itself.10 8 While these laws may violate princi-
ples of economic efficiency, they are nonetheless basic to the fabric of
our society and any attempt to upset them would pose a serious chal-
lenge to federalism.
In other areas, the question of what laws and regulations are vital
to important policies must be decided on a case-by-case basis. There
may be some situations, within the category of professional licensing,
for example, where state policy will become important upon closer
study. In these cases rulemaking is the ideal decisionmaking frame-
work: it maximizes the scope of analysis prior to decision, and
for this reason is broadly acknowledged to be the superior forum to
raise and resolve policy disputes.109 In the drug rule, for example,
every state has been given an opportunity to make arguments on why
the ban on advertising of drug prices is vital to important policy goals.
The Commission has stated the evidentiary burden -as follows:
As to drug price disclosures, if net consumer injury is large
enough and federal public policy favoring price disclosure and price
competition clear enough, then state anti-advertising laws must be
essentially indispensible to achieve critical state policy goals if they
are to be spared preemption." 0'
In addition the Commission has itself collected and analyzed several of
the most familiar arguments in favor of advertising restrictions as a
105. Cf. Tribe, Forward: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and
Law, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1973).
106. It is in this way that the commerce clause preemption analysis offered in
Cottrell departs from the FTCA preemption analysis proposed herein.
107. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.s. 398 (1963); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961).
108. See note 34 supra.
109. See K. DAvis, ArDmm4LsRATrvm LAw TEXr § 6.03 (3d ed. 1972).
110. SrAFF REPORT 317.
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means of focusing the discussion.111 If there are important arguments
to be made by the states in opposition to the drug rule, every opportuni-
ty permits them to be made. Indeed in some ways states get a much
better hearing on the preemption issue before the FTC than they would
before a congressional committee that was proposing a federal law
which would have a similar preemptive effect. While a state loses the
right to have its representatives vote directly on the proposition, it none-
theless gets a full blown examination of the issue before an independent
and expert body with time to assess, reflect and reply in an orderly
fashion that is rarely available in Congress.
The role of the courts in judicial review of rules that preempt state
laws or regulations is a crucial aspect of the continued protection of
federalism contemplated by the 1975 amendment. While courts usually
exercise soft review of federal laws that happen to have preemptive
effect, 112 the rulemaking provisions grant the courts a more active role
in determining whether the FTC has by rule undermined state policies.
The more tough-minded standard of substantial evidence review is the
device employed."" In effect the courts on direct review of the rules
must make two determinations: whether the rule is justified in terms of
the facts in the rulemaking record, and whether it is the kind of rule the
Commission has the jurisdiction to make preemptive. In deciding the
second question, the courts have the assignment of second guessing the
Commission on whether vital state laws and important state policies
have been overridden. This scrutiny is somewhat different from the
scope of review over facts that is normally associated with the substantial
evidence test.' 4  But the challenge is no less direct. The court is
encouraged to consider closely the rationality of the rule in terms of the
appropriateness of preemption. This requires much the same kind of
examination as does a review of the jurisdictional facts upon which an
agency decision is based. The record of the drug rule, for example, will
111. Alleged disadvantages of price disclosure discussed by the Commission include
drug abuse problems; interference with patient drug use; demeaning of the pharmacy
profession, and so forth. See STAFF REPORT 289-473.
112. See, e.g., North Dakota Bd. of Pharmacies v. Snyder's Drug Store, 414 U.S. 156
(1973); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (upholding state statutes).
113. This standard, 15 U.S.C.A. § 57a(e) (3) (A) (Supp. 1976), provides for rules to
be set aside if "the court finds that the Commission's action is not supported by
substantial evidence in the rulemaking record. . . taken as a whole. . . ." Rulemaking
record is defined as the rule, the statement of basis and purpose, the transcript, any
written submissions and any observations considered relevant by the Commission. Id. §
57a(e)(1)(B). This definition assists the court in knowing the limits of its reviewing
role. See Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L REv. 185 (1974).
114. See generally Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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show whether the states have demonstrated vital interests that ought to
preclude preemption. Indications that some states favor the rule -while
others do not cut against a conclusion of uniform importance of the
state policy. Indeed, where it can be shown that the states divide on
the preemption issue, the case for overturning the rule is weakened.
One of the advantages of the rulemaking context is that, by virtue of
the exemption provision,"x5 a national rule can be established without
necessarily ignoring the exceptional situations of a few isolated states;
these can be dealt with individually (and by the same standard) at
a later time.
V. CONCLUSION
The sensitive issue of the FTC preemption of state laws and
regulations that inhibit competition is best resolved by the cautious
analysis expressed in Parker v. Brown."16 This requires a close look at
congressional intent to determine whether the power to preempt has
been granted to the Commission. Indications are that before 1975 such
intent was lacking. In 1975, however, Congress passed an amendment
that reassessed the preemption issue in light of perceived notions of
federalism. While the Commission was not given the authority broadly
to occupy the field of state unfair competition in consumer protection
law, it was authorized to declare by rule preemption of state activities
that conflict with federal regulations. Since the rulemaking provisions
are carefully surrounded by procedural protections, minimal injury is
done to federal-state relations. In the drug rule this new approach is
being implemented for the first time, and indications are that federalism
interests can be protected while some measure of competition is simul-
taneously restored to the prescription drug market. It remains to be
seen whether the course of the Commission's preemption rulemaking
will be comparably charted in the future.
115. 15 U.S.C.A. .§ 57a(g) (Supp. 1976).
116. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Professor Handler has recently emphasized the need
to consider Parker as "integral to our federalism" in order to resist the increasingly
popular notion of broad Sherman Act preemption of state laws and regulations. See
Handler, supra note 12, at 20. This message helps fix a proper scope for preemption
under the 1975 FTCA amendments as well.
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